Our subjective mental life

[coberst]

Our subjective mental life

We constantly make subjective judgments regarding abstract things, such as morality, difficulty, importance; we also have subjective experiences such as affection, desire, and achievement.

The manner in which we reason, and visualize about these matters comes from other domains of experience. “These other domains are mostly sensorimotor domains¦as when we conceptualize understanding an idea (subjective experience) in terms of grasping an object (sensorimotor experience)¦The cognitive mechanism for such conceptualizations is conceptual metaphor, which allows us to use the physical logic of grasping to reason about understanding.

Metaphor is pervasive throughout thought and language. Primary metaphors might properly be considered to be the fundamental building blocks for our thinking and our communication through language.

The theory of primary metaphors has four parts:

1) Johnson’s theory of conflation—in the early years of childhood the sensorimotor experiences are often conflated with the subjective (nonsensorimotor) experiences and judgments. An example might be when a newborn experiences the warmth of the embrace by its mother and that literal experience becomes conflated with a later subjective experience of affection. That is why our feeling of affection is accompanied by a sense of warmth. “During the early period of conflation, associations are automatically built up between the two domains. Later, during a period of differentiation, children then able to separate out the domains, but the cross-domain associations persist.

2) Grady’s theory of primary metaphor—complex metaphors are like molecular structure with primary metaphors as the atomic elements.

3) Narayanan’s neural theory of metaphor—the associations made during conflation “are realized neurally in simultaneous activations that result in permanent neural connections being made across the neural networks that define conceptual domains¦that constitute metaphorical entailments.

4) Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blending—Distinct separate conceptual domains can be coactivated thereby creating a blending, which creates new and unique conceptual blends.

“The integrated theory –the four parts together—has an overwhelming implication: We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in the everyday world from our earliest days¦we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors.

In summation, we have many hundreds of primary metaphors, which together provide a rich inferential structure, imagery, and qualitative feel. These primary metaphors permit our sensorimotor experiences to be used to create subjective experiences. Thus abstract ideas are created that are grounded in everyday experiences.

Do you have any idea how abstract ideas might be created other wise?

Quotes from Philosophy in the Flesh by Lakoff and Johnson

[yaaarrrgg]

Looking at my own thought processes, I also think the information is encoded in a way that's organized by similarity. The best analogy I can give is to build a tree, where the nodes take alternate branches, and the trunk is the core of similarities.

For example: in seeing a handful of words (as a crude example):

cat, car, carrot

they become organized by similarity, in space (crudely):

c

a

t r

. . r

. . o

. . t

It also serves to compress the space required to store the information.

Then small connections form between then in re-encountering the same experience of things, triggering a broad array of association, and inferences form.

The resulting structures look like a small forest of trees.