I suggest you do cherry pick and are extremely selective in the views you present.
Your bias is clearly geared towards anti Americanism but considering your own govt. is up to their eyeballs in manipulating a dozen countries that dont suit their needs or serve their purpose you choose to publish only your thoughts on what America has done to destroy the world.
This is the real point.
Please read.
This paper is published by Chatham House and
the Institute of Iranian Studies, University of St
Andrews
Preliminary Analysis of the Voting
Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential
Election
Editor:
Professor Ali Ansari, Director, Institute of Iranian Studies,
University of St Andrews; Associate Fellow, Middle East and
North Africa Programme, Chatham House; author, ‘Iran,
Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change’
Research and Analysis:
Daniel Berman and Thomas Rintoul, Institute of Iranian
Studies, University of St Andrews
21 June 2009
Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to government or
to any political body. It does not hold opinions of its own; the views
expressed in this text are the responsibility of the authors. This
document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the
authors and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date
of the publication.
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election
Chatham House - Home 2
Executive Summary
Working from the province by province breakdowns of the 2009 and 2005
results, released by the Iranian Ministry of Interior on the Farsi pages of their
website shortly after the election, and from the 2006 census as published by
the official Statistical Centre of Iran, the following observations about the
official data and the debates surrounding it can be made.
· In two conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a turnout of
more than 100% was recorded.
· If Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory was primarily caused by the
increase in voter turnout, one would expect the data to show that the
provinces with the greatest increase in voter turnout would also show
the greatest 'swing' in support towards Ahmadinejad. This is not the
case.
· In a third of all provinces, the official results would require that
Ahmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, all former
centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former
reformist voters, despite a decade of conflict between these two
groups.
· In 2005, as in 2001 and 1997, conservative candidates, and
Ahmadinejad in particular, were markedly unpopular in rural areas.
That the countryside always votes conservative is a myth. The claim
that this year Ahmadinejad swept the board in more rural provinces
flies in the face of these trends.
-UPDATEThese
results are not significantly affected by the statement of the Guardian
Council that some voters may have voted outside their home district, thus
causing the irregularities highlighted by the defeated Mohsen Rezai.
Whilst it is possible for large numbers of voters to cast their ballots outside
their home district (one of 366), the proportion of people who would have cast
their votes outside their home province is much smaller, as the 30 provinces
are too large for effective commuting across borders. In Yazd, for example,
where turnout was above 100% at provincial level, there are no significant
population centres near provincial boundaries.
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election
Chatham House - Home 3
1. Irregularities in Voter Turnout
Two provinces show a turnout of over 100% and four more show a turnout of
over 90%. Regional variations in participation have disappeared. There is no
correlation between the increase in participation and the swing to Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
Firstly, across the board there is a massive increase in turnout with several
provinces increasing their participation rate by nearly 75%. This increase
results in substantially less variation in turnout between provinces, with the
standard deviation amongst provincial turnouts falling by just over 23% since
2005. The 2005 results show a substantial turnout gap, with seven provinces
recording turnout below 60%, and ten above 70%. In 2009, only two were
below 70% and 24 were above 80%. In fact, 21 out of 30 provinces had
turnouts within 5% of 83%. The data seems to suggest that regional variations
in participation have suddenly disappeared.
This makes the lack of a link between the provinces that saw an increase in
turnout and those that saw a swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig.1) all the more
unusual. There is no significant correlation between the increase in
participation for a given province and the swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig.1). The
lack of a direct relationship makes the argument that Ahmadinejad won the
election because of an increase in participation by a previously silent
conservative majority somewhat problematic.
Furthermore, there are concerns about the numbers themselves. Two
provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, have results which indicate that more votes
were cast on 12 June than there were eligible voters and that four more
provinces had turnouts of around 95%.
In a country where allegations of ‘tombstone voting’ – the practice of using the
identity documents of the deceased to cast additional ballots – are both longstanding
and widespread, this result is troubling but perhaps not unexpected.
This problem did not start with Ahmadinejad; according to official statistics
gathered by the International institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
in Stockholm, there were 12.9% more registered voters at the time of
Mohammed Khatami’s 2001 victory than there were citizens of voting age1.
1 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ‘Voter Turnout
Database’, Country View: Iran
Available at
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=IR
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election
Chatham House - Home 4
In conclusion, a number of aspects of the reported turnout figures are
problematic: the massive increases from 2005; the collapse of regional
variations; and the absence of any clear link between increases in turnout and
increased support for any one candidate.
Fig.1 There is no significant relationship between the increase in turnout in a
province, and the 'swing' of support to Ahmadinejad.
Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election
Chatham House - Home 5
2. Where did Ahmadinejad’s New Votes Come From?
According to the official Ministry of Interior voting data (see Appendix),
Mahmud Ahmadinejad has increased the conservative vote by 113%
compared to the 2005 election. There is little correlation in provincial-level
results between the increase in turnout and the swing to Ahmadinejad,
challenging the notion that a previously silent conservative majority came out
to support him. Interestingly, in 10 out of 30 provinces, mainly former Mehdi
Karrubi strongholds, the official data suggests that Ahmadinejad not only
received the votes of all former non-voters and former President, Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani voters, but also took up to 44% of the vote from those
who had previously voted reformist.
According to the official data2, Ahmadinejad has received approximately 13m
more votes in this election than the combined conservative vote in the 2005
Presidential election3.
Assuming that Ahmadinejad retained all 11.5m conservative votes from 2005,
these additional 13m votes could have come from three sources, in
descending order of likelihood:
· The approximately 10.6m citizens who did not vote in 2005, but chose
to vote in this election
· The 6.2m citizens who voted for the centrist Rafsanjani in 2005
· The 10.4m citizens who voted for reformist candidates in 2005
In order to examine in detail where Ahmadinejad’s increased support came
from, the table below (Fig.3) shows the composition of the 2009 vote by
province, dividing it into those who voted conservative, Rafsanjani, and
reformist in 2005, and those who did not vote at all in 2005. It assumes that
2005 voters will vote again.
The table demonstrates that in the 10 of Iran’s 30 provinces highlighted, in
order for the official statistics to be correct, Ahmadinejad would have needed
2 Serious complaints have been raised about both the 2005 elections and the 2009
elections. Government data is not perfectly reliable.
3 In 2005 there were three conservative candidates in the first round. Ahmadinejad can
reasonably be expected to have received in 2009, all votes cast for conservatives in
2005. This paper compares Ahmadinejad’s 2009 performance to the combined
performance of all three conservatives in 2005.
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election
Chatham House - Home 6
to win over all new voters, all former Rafsanjani voters, and also up to 44% of
former reformist voters.
It is notable that many of these are provinces where the reformist cleric Mehdi
Karrubi polled highly in 2005. The government’s figures would appear to
suggest that Karrubi’s former supporters have not voted tactically for the likely
reformist challenger Mir Hussein Musavi, as many had expected, but rather
that they have defected to the hard-line conservative incumbent Ahmadinejad.
This interpretation is to some extent supported by the relationship between the
percentage of former Karrubi voters in a province and its swing to
Ahmadinejad (Fig.2).
To many reformists, this situation is extremely unlikely. Mehdi Karrubi is a
well-known reformist, whose views are diametrically opposed to
Ahmadinejad’s on issues of political and cultural freedoms, economic
management, and foreign policy. They allege fraud, and it is likely that the
provinces where Karrubi’s vote has collapsed will provide the bulk of the 600+
complaints which the defeated candidates are lodging against the conduct of
the election.
However, Karrubi, like Ahmadinejad, is seen as a ‘man of the people’, and
Ahmadinejad is as much a reincarnation of the Islamic Republic’s early hard
left as he is a leader of its current hard right. Ahmadinejad’s supporters thus
claim that rural voters voted for Ahmadinejad in 2009 for precisely the same
reasons that they voted for Karrubi in 2005.
The data offers no arbitration in this dispute, although Boudewijn Roukema’s
application of statistical fraud detection techniques to the ‘by district’ data has
turned up some anomalies with respect to the figures for Karrubi’s vote4 which
may suggest that they were created by a computer. These can be followed up
should the fully disaggregated ‘by polling station’ data be released during the
ongoing dispute.
4 B Roukena, Nicolaus Copernicus University, ‘Benford's Law Anomalies in the 200
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election
Chatham House - Home 7
Fig.2 If Ahmadinejad's victory was caused primarily by defections from
Karrubi, then it would be expected that Ahmadinejad would gain his greatest
swings in provinces where Karrubi had a lot of support in 2005. This could be
possible, however it is unlikely.
Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009