Here's an excerpt from the official record. I'm not going to comment here, I'll put in my two cents after you've read the excerpt.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/p ... kwell1.pdf
...12 SURVEILLANCE
12.1 DC U commenced a Surveillance Running log within Room 1600 at
04:38hrs.
12.2 ’Frank’ deployed with the SO12 surveillance Red team to the SCOTIA
ROAD area and surveillance commenced at 0604. He maintained a
surveillance log and recorded any relevant sightings by his team until
08:45hrs when he handed over responsibility for the log to Tango 9.
12.3 ’Frank commenced direct observation on the communal entrance to the
block of flats in SCOTIA ROAD, SW2 that included number 21. ’Frank’
is a member of the SO12 surveillance team. He was secreted in an
observation van that provided a clear un-obstructed view of the
entrance. He was equipped with a video camera that allowed him to
take video footage. The camera was not continually switched on and
was only operated when activated by ’Frank;. There was no facility to
relay images back to Room 1600. ’Frank’ loaded the camera with what
he assumed was a blank tape on 20 July 2005; it was not an original
sealed tape.
12.4 Subsequent investigation by the IPCC has revealed that ’Frank’ had the
necessary leads to connect the camera to the vehicle’s electrical system,
but chose instead to rely on the camera’s battery, switching the
equipment off when not in use.
12.5 At 0605 ’Edward’ saw the Nissan Primera vehicle parked near to the
flats in SCOTIA ROAD.
12.6 Between 07:36hrs and 11:02hrs ‘Frank’ observed eight people leave the
flats. Six of these were captured on the video recording. These images
have been copied onto a composite DVD produced on behalf of the
IPCC, that shows all the relevant CCTV images gathered during Mr DE
MENEZES’ journey onto the platform at STOCKWELL Underground.
12.7 At 08:33hrs ’James’ deployed the Grey surveillance team in the TULSE
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HILL area in order to follow suspects away from the premises. He
maintained a log of relevant radio transmissions until ‘Ken’ joined him
and took over that responsibility.
12.8 ’Nick’ was deployed in Room 1600 as Silver Firearms Liaison. He gives
evidence of a phone call he had with ‘Derek’, the red team surveillance
team leader. ‘Derek’ expressed concerns about the distance between
SCOTIA ROAD and the current CO19 team location at NIGHTINGALE
LANE. He was also concerned about access that any subject would
have to nearby buses, which were still running. He discussed these
concerns with Trojan 80. Commander DICK made the decision to allow
the buses to continue to operate because she thought it might alert any
suspects if they stopped operating.
12.9 At 09:33hrs ’Frank’ needed to urinate in a plastic container while inside
the observation van. At this time he saw a male person exit the flats.
He described the person as IC/1 (Identity Code 1- White) 5’8â€, dark hair,
beard / stubble, blue denim jacket, blue jeans and wearing trainers. He
checked the photographs of the suspects that he had been provided with
and transmitted over the radio to his colleagues that ‘it would be worth
somebody else having a look’. He was unable to switch on the video
camera while using his radio. The person sighted coming out of the flats
was Jean Charles DE MENEZES.
12.10 Shortly before 09:39hrs ’James’ saw Mr DE MENEZES walking in
UPPER TULSE HILL towards TULSE HILL. He described him as about
5’10†tall of stocky build with collar length black hair and stubble, with a
wide face. He described his complexion as being similar to a light
skinned North African. ’James’ examined the photographs provided to
him during the briefing and was of the opinion that the male was
‘possibly identical’ to the subject NETTLE TIP. ’Tim’ heard ’James’
describe Mr DE MENEZES as a ‘good possible likeness to the subject
NETTLE TIP’.
12.11 ’Harry’ also observed him at this time. He saw Mr DE MENEZES looking
over his shoulder and acting in a wary manner. He appeared nervous.
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’Harry’ was not able to identify the male as being identical to the first
suspect OSMAN.
12.12 ’Tim’ was directed to attempt to record video footage of the male person,
but he was never able to get himself in a position to achieve this.
Similarly, ’Ken’ deployed on foot in attempt to provide a better
identification but due to his radio malfunctioning he was unable to
transmit or hear what was being communicated. Because of this he was
unable to get into a position to observe Mr DE MENEZES’ face. He was
able to see Mr DE MENEZES turn left into TULSE HILL and board a
number 2 bus towards BRIXTON.
12.13 At 09:39hrs ’Ivor’ saw the bus move northbound towards BRIXTON and
he saw Mr DE MENEZES sitting at the extreme rear nearside of the bus.
’Ivor’ boarded the bus between TULSE HILL and BRIXTON. At about
09:47hrs Mr DE MENEZES stood up. At this time ’Ivor’ received a
phone call from ’Harry’ enquiring as to the identity of the subject being
followed. ’Ivor’ stated that he could not positively identify the male as the
first suspect Hussain OSMAN, (NETTLE TIP) but that he had distinctive
‘Mongolian eyes’. ’Harry’ relayed this information to the remainder of the
team. CCTV has been retrieved from the bus and provides the first
recorded image of Mr DE MENEZES during his journey.
12.14 At 09:46hrs Trojan 80’s loggist notes ‘Not ident male as above
discounted. Surveillance team to withdraw to original positions.’
Although this is consistent with the uncertainty of the surveillance team
regarding the identification, this event is not mentioned in any of their
evidence.
12.15 At 09:47hrs ’Graham’ observed Mr DE MENEZES get off the bus in
BRIXTON ROAD, just south of BRIXTON Underground station. ’Ivor’
saw him walking for about 20 metres before he ran back towards the bus
he had just left. He joined a queue boarding the bus while using his
mobile phone.
12.16 ’Laurence’ also observed Mr DE MENEZES walking away from the bus.
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Initially he only had a side view of his face, but as he drove past him he
managed to get a full frontal view of his face for a split second. Shortly
afterwards he joined up with ‘James’ and ‘Ken’ and informed them that
he did not believe that the person was identical to NETTLE TIP.
12.17 Hotel 11 also saw him get off the bus, and then rejoin the queue and use
his mobile phone. From a distance of 10 metres Hotel 11 considered the
person to be a similar likeness to the photograph he had seen
previously. It is at this point that CO19 officers and those in Room 1600
state that they were made aware that Mr DE MENEZES was acting
nervously or ‘twitchy’. There is no evidence from the surveillance team
of this at this time or later.
12.18 Detective Superintendent V from SO12 states that there are no technical
means within Room 1600 to record communications and that it is the
role of the Surveillance Monitor to make notes of the transmissions.
12.19 Some of the staff within Room 1600, including ’Owen’, described the
environment there as being very noisy and indicate that it was necessary
to shout to ensure that senior officers were aware of what was going on.
Commander DICK however was satisfied that the room was operating
effectively. She was aware that the surveillance team were following a
person and trying to determine whether or not he was one of the
suspects. Commander DICK states ’Pat’ then informed her “it is him, the
man is off the bus. They think it is him and he is very, very jumpy.†This
is recorded within her loggist’s notes.
12.20 DCI C was at the TA Centre when he heard over the surveillance radio
that the person being followed on the bus had been identified as
NETTLE TIP. He was in no doubt this was a positive identification.
Trojan 84 and Delta 10 returned to the vehicle having also heard this.
The CO19 units commenced making their way towards BRIXTON.
Open telephone lines were established between Commander DICK and
DCI C and between Trojan 80 and Trojan 84.
12.21 An SO13 debrief team led by DS Piers DINGEMANS had been deployed
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to debrief the unidentified person and were making ground to catch up
with the bus. Given the apparent identification of the subject, they were
stood down at approximately 09:55hrs, despite the fact that CO19 were
not then in a position to respond.
12.22 Commander DICK sought additional confirmation regarding identification
and through ’Pat’ asked the Surveillance team to give a percentage
indication of how certain they were. This was a check that Commander
DICK knew was used frequently during surveillance operations regarding
kidnaps and hostage scenarios. D/Superintendent BOUTCHER made a
similar request on a scale of 1 – 10. ’James’ received this message and
considered this to be a ‘ridiculous question’ and one impossible to
answer. He informed ’Pat’ that when he briefly saw the male at 0939 he
thought he was a ‘good possible’ for the subject NETTLE TIP’ but since
that time none of his team had been able to get a close look at him. He
did not communicate to ’Pat’ that in fact one of his team, ’Laurence’, had
indicated that he did not believe that the person was identical to NETTLE
TIP. He also failed to relay that ’Harry’ was not able to identify the male
as being identical to the first suspect. OSMAN.
12.23 ’James’ stated that he thought it was the subject and that was the reason
for the continuation of the surveillance. He agreed to ask his team if
anyone could give a percentage but got no reply. This was relayed to
‘Pat’ and then to Commander DICK. Although ’Pat’ does not himself
recall saying this, Commander DICK and others in her presence heard
’Pat’ say words to the effect that ‘They can’t give a percentage but they
believe it is NETTLE TIP’.
12.24 ’Laurence’ had boarded the number 2 bus at approximately 09:55hrs
along STOCKWELL ROAD. He located Mr DE MENEZES on the upper
deck and sat 3 rows behind him. ’Laurence’ sent a text message to
’Harry’ to update him. As the message was being sent Mr DE MENEZES
got up and moved towards the stairs. A few moments later ’Laurence’
received a call from ’Harry’ and he verbally updated him on Mr DE
MENEZES’ movements.
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12.25 The CO19 team together with DCI C were doing their best to catch up
with the surveillance team and were travelling towards STOCKWELL on
blue lights and sirens. Commander DICK and Trojan 80 were
considering their tactical options. Interception on the bus had been
considered but rejected as being too dangerous.
12.26 At approximately 10:03hrs Mr DE MENEZES got off the bus at
STOCKWELL. ’Ken’ witnessed this. He looked at his face and believed
that he was possibly the subject NETTLE TIP. Still unsure, ’Ken’ saw Mr
DE MENEZES walk past the National Westminster bank. He states he
transmitted that the unknown male in denim was off the bus on a
reciprocal route passing the bank. He then watched him cross over the
road and into STOCKWELL Underground station.
12.27 At this time, our investigation has since revealed that none of the
surveillance team had positively identified the subject as NETTLE TIP.
Furthermore none of them agree that they heard anyone communicate
that it was a definite positive identification. Conversely it seems that the
Senior Officers in Room 1600 and the CO19 team including DCI C all
believed that a positive identification had been established. As CO19
reached STOCKWELL, the Firearms Team Leader ’Ralph’ heard over
the radio that; ‘it was definitely our man and that he was nervous and
twitchy.’
12.28 Despite the belief within Room 1600 that NETTLE TIP had been
identified it should be noted that every entry on the Surveillance Running
Log refers to the person as being ‘U/I male’, U/I meaning unidentified.
12.29 Commander DICK in consultation with Trojan 80 decided that ‘the
subject believed to be NETTLE TIP cannot be allowed to enter the tube
system. He must be arrested before by SO19’ (Decision Log 16). Her
decision was communicated directly to both Trojan 80, who was next to
her and to DCI C who had an open phone link. In turn both of these
relayed the instructions to Trojan 84. (Trojan 84 being with DCI C and
having an open phone link with Trojan 80).
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12.30 Central 1614 entered Room 1600 and heard the surveillance monitor
commenting that the man under surveillance was on a bus. He then
heard he was getting off the bus and the surveillance monitor asking
Senior officers whether he should be stopped. He states that
Commander DICK and a senior SO13 officer shouted, ‘yes stop him’. It
then became apparent that CO19 were not at STOCKWELL station and
there appeared to be some confusion as to who this command was
relayed to. Someone asked ‘Who has been told to stop him’ and a reply
of ‘SO12’ was given.
12.31 At this point CO19 had still not reached STOCKWELL Underground
station. ’Ivor’ sought a decision from Room 1600 via ’James’ regarding
the armed SO12 officers doing the stop. Although this was not a
preferred option Commander DICK agreed that this might well be
necessary. However as this was being communicated, DCI C informed
her that CO19 had arrived at STOCKWELL Underground station. It
should be noted that the CCTV evidence shows that the CO19 officers
entered the underground station some two minutes after Mr DE
MENEZES had passed through the ticket barriers13.
12.32 Trojan 84 was told by DCI C to intercept the subject and by Trojan 80 to
stop the subject getting on the tube. Trojan 84 then transmitted over the
radio to the CO19 officers that ‘they want us to stop the subject getting
on the tube’. At this point ’Ralph’ communicated that the CO19 officers
were going State Red. (This indicates to the firearms team and the
surveillance team that CO19 now has control and that an armed
interception is imminent).
12.33 When ’Ralph’ received the message from Trojan 84 that, ‘he’s to be
stopped getting on the tube’, he took it to mean CO19 were to intercept
and detain him if possible. However, given the intelligence they had and
the fact that he believed this to be a confirmed suicide bomber getting
onto a train, he felt there was a genuine possibility that the suspect could
be shot and killed in order to save life.
13 During the criminal proceedings ‘Ralph’ gave evidence that, had CO19 been given the order to go to
‘State Amber’ whilst travelling towards Stockwell tube station, they would have been in a position to
intercept Mr de Menezes when he got off the bus prior to entering Stockwell tube station.
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12.34 Commander DICK, DCI C, Trojan 80 and Trojan 84 remain satisfied that
this was an unambiguous command to stop and intercept the person
believed to be NETTLE TIP. However some other officers who heard
this communication perceived it differently.
12.35 The following are either direct or summary quotations of perceptions
from certain police officers at the point Mr DE MENEZES entered the
station:
12.36 Acting Detective Superintendent X who was within Room 1600 states he
heard Commander DICK say ‘the male must not be allowed to get on a
train at all costs’. Charlie 11 interpreted this as an intervention from the
DSO that they were to be immediately deployed to stop the suspect from
taking any action. Charlie 6 interpreted this as an instruction to stop a
suicide bomber. He believed he may have to shoot this man in order to
stop him killing members of the public and himself. ’William’ believed
that this was a KRATOS incident and he needed to engage the subject
and be convinced that the rounds would not over penetrate and stop the
subject immediately from detonating any device. He considered he must
be stopped at all costs. In a subsequent statement he adds ‘this all
leads me to believe this to be a KRATOS incident if the male did not
comply immediately with police actions or requirements.’ ‘Vic’ states ‘I
heard who I believed to be 84 say, ‘They’ve said he’s to be
stopped. Do not let him on the tube. Do not let him get on the tube’, the
tone of voice and urgency of this radio transmission, combined with all
the intelligence meant to me that he must be stopped immediately and at
any cost. I believed that a bombing of the tube could be imminent and
must be prevented’.
12.37 There is no evidence that Commander DICK used any code word
associated with Operation C or gave any order for the man to receive a
critical headshot without challenge.
12.38 Despite Commander DICK’s decision, it was too late to prevent Mr DE
MENEZES going into the station. He picked up a Metro Newspaper
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from a stand then used his Oyster card to go quite normally through the
automatic barrier. He used the escalator to descend towards the
platform. He walked down the moving escalator on its left side and was
seen to run near at the end towards Platform 2 for the North bound
Northern line and onto a train.
12.39 Some seconds later officers from CO19 arrived at the barriers and
attempted to jump over or push through them. This was undoubtedly the
origin of later press reports that Mr DE MENEZES had jumped over the
barriers while being chased14.
12.40 ’Ivor’ followed Mr DE MENEZES onto the train. He entered a carriage in
front of him and turned right taking a seat facing the platform with a glass
panel to his right. ’Ivor’ took a seat to his left with two or three
passengers sitting between them. ’Geoff’ sat down two seats to the left
of ’Ivor’.
12.41 ’Ken’ took a seat some 20 yards to the right of Mr DE MENEZES.
’Malcolm’ entered the train but could not immediately see Mr DE
MENEZES. He then returned to the escalator to establish
communications with those above ground and saw four or five officers
who he recognised from CO19 running down the escalators.
12.42 A CO19 officer boarded the train near to ’Ken’ and asked ‘Where is he’
’Ken’ indicated towards his left. As far as ’Ken’ was concerned he was
merely indicating towards the subject of their surveillance. Another CO19
officer entered the carriage and again ’Ken’ indicated towards Mr DE
MENEZES15.
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13 THE SHOOTING
13.1 In addition to the police officers, there were 17 passengers in the
carriage at the time the incident commenced. They have seen or heard
various parts of the traumatic incident. Some of them, undoubtedly due
to shock, have provided what are assessed to be somewhat inaccurate
accounts of what happened. Every statement taken from these 17
witnesses will be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service.
13.2 There is no doubt that officers shouted ‘armed police’ as they ran down
the escalators and onto the platform in an attempt to clear the area of
passengers. It is perhaps significant that none of the 17 witnesses
recall hearing the police officers shout ‘police’ or ‘armed police’
immediately prior to the shooting, whilst the eight police officers on the
train recall either shouting or hearing this. Those officers have been
interviewed under caution concerning allegations that they have
conspired to pervert the course of justice.
13.3 This report details the police officers accounts and those of the
passengers.
13.4 On seeing CO19 officers on the platform ’Ivor’ got up from his seat and
placed his foot by the train door to prevent it from closing. He shouted
‘he’s here’ and indicated towards Mr DE MENEZES. He heard the word
‘police’ shouted and turned towards Mr DE MENEZES who had got up
and walked towards the police officers. ’Ivor’ considered that Mr DE
MENEZES was agitated and noticed that his hands were held below his
waist and slightly in front of him. He continued to walk towards ’Ivor’
and fearing for the safety of everyone on the train he grabbed Mr DE
MENEZES around his torso and pinned his arms to his side. He then
pushed Mr DE MENEZES back into the seat that he had been sitting
on.
13.5 Charlie 2 having heard the order to stop him getting on the tube
believed this was relayed from the DSO and that this suspect was a
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suicide bomber who had entered the tube in order to blow up a train.
On entering the ticket hall he saw Charlie 12 and climbed over the ticket
barriers. At the bottom of the escalators a male, presumably ’Malcolm’
indicated that the suspect was on the northbound tube. Charlie 2 drew
his handgun as he reached the train and another male, presumably
’Ken’ who was on the train, indicated towards Mr DE MENEZES.
Charlie 2 followed Charlie 12 onto the carriage.
13.6 Charlie 2 saw a person he believed to be a surveillance officer point at
a male who Charlie 2 described ‘as Asian, dressed in jeans wearing a
bulky looking denim jacket’. Mr DE MENEZES stood up and was
grabbed by the surveillance officer who pushed him back onto the seat.
13.7 Charlie 2 was convinced Mr DE MENEZES was a suicide bomber about
to detonate a bomb. He states that he honestly believed that unless he
acted immediately everyone present was about to die. He formed the
opinion that the only option was to shoot the man in the head and kill
him instantly to prevent any detonation. Charlie 2 ran forward and
reached over the top of ’Ivor’ shouting ‘Armed Police’. He held his gun
to Mr DE MENEZES’ head and fired.
13.8 Charlie 2 was aware that Charlie 12 was also firing. Charlie 2 cleared a
blockage in his gun and continued firing until he was certain that the
threat had been eliminated.
13.9 Upon hearing the command State Red Charlie 12 had run into the
underground and down the escalators. He was the first to reach the
train and was aware that Charlie 2 was right behind him. He was
directed to Mr DE MENEZES by people he presumed to be surveillance
officers.
13.10 Charlie 12 described Mr DE MENEZES as Asian looking wearing a
‘bulky’ denim jacket.
13.11 Charlie 12 states that Mr DE MENEZES advanced towards them. His
hands were down by his side. Charlie 12 shouted ‘armed police’ and
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pointed his gun. He considered that Mr DE MENEZES was closing
them down and he thought that he was about to detonate a bomb and
kill everyone. He believed he had to shoot him first.
13.12 ’Ivor’ then grabbed Mr DE MENEZES and pushed him back into the
seat. Charlie 12 states that the only option was to shoot Mr DE
MENEZES in the head to kill him instantly and save the lives of those
present. He did not consider there was any alternative. He fired a
number of shots; he was aware of other gunshots and being hit in the
face by debris. He believed he would not be safe until the man was
dead. He states that he honestly believed the male to be a suicide
bomber. Mr DE MENEZES fell towards the floor and as he did so
Charlie 12 fired again.
13.13 Charlie 5 entered the carriage and saw ’Ivor’ lurch towards another
male who was either standing or attempting to stand. He heard shouts
of ‘armed police’ and heard several shots fired. He then grabbed hold
of ’Ivor’ and forced him to the ground, and pointed his pistol at his head
before ’Ivor’ identified himself as a police officer.
13.14 ’Terry’, another team leader, followed Charlie 2 onto the train and
became aware of a struggle taking place. He states he heard
challenges of ‘armed police’ and called out ‘armed police’ himself. He
states he heard cracking noises in front of him, the struggle continued
and he formed the opinion that shots had been fired but was initially
unsure by whom. After a momentary pause the shots resumed. He
saw Mr DE MENEZES slumped over the seat, face down. ’Terry’ was
concerned about the possibility of a concealed explosive device and
began to order an evacuation of the remaining people in the carriage.
13.15 Delta 4 heard the shouting and shots being fired. He looked into the
carriage and saw Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 struggling with Mr DE
MENEZES who was on his knees bent onto a seat. He then heard the
sound of more shots and saw Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 move aside. He
saw wounds to Mr DE MENEZES’ head. Delta 4 then instructed other
officers to get off the carriage, as he believed that Mr DE MENEZES
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was a suicide bomber.
13.16 Delta 9 was directed towards the carriage and saw Mr DE MENEZES
sitting on the far side of the carriage. He could hear shouts of ‘armed
police’. Mr DE MENEZES suddenly stood up and was grabbed by
’Ivor’. He saw Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 either side of Mr DE MENEZES
who appeared to have gone rigid. Delta 9 thought he was resisting and
could see his hand down to his right side. Delta 9 bent down and
controlled the lower half of Mr DE MENEZES body and tried to get to
his hands to stop him detonating a device. He then heard a number of
shots fired and saw blood coming from Mr DE MENEZES face. He then
shouted for people to get off the train.
13.17 ’William’ ran onto the platform. He believed this was a KRATOS incident
and believed that he had to engage the subject if the subject did not
immediately reply. He would need to be convinced that the rounds
would not over penetrate and stop the subject from detonating any
device. On reaching the platform he heard shots being fired. He then
saw a person in the tunnel, on the tracks. He challenged this person
and pointed his firearm at him. He was subsequently identified as the
train driver who was taking refuge.
13.18 It is apparent that the actions of the surveillance officers who boarded
the carriage caught the attention of the other passengers. Some
witnesses refer to a man of Asian appearance carrying a rucksack.
Although not of Asian ethnicity it would appear that they are referring to
’Ivor’.
13.19 Witness YA was a passenger on the train. He saw what he thought to
be a group of armed police officers. As they passed him he heard
someone say ‘he’s here’ and someone say ’get down’ He then heard
the sound of gunshots.
13.20 Witness YB was a passenger on the train with his girlfriend YC. As the
train was stationary at STOCKWELL he became aware of someone
running past him and heard the word ’here’ spoken. He then saw a
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man entering the carriage wearing a red T-shirt and pointing a small
black handgun towards a man sat opposite him. He saw three other
armed men. The first gunmen pointed his gun at the right side of the
man’s head from a distance of about 12 inches. He describes the
person as wearing a denim jacket and blue top and formed the
impression that he was reaching for the left side of his trouser
waistband.
13.21 Witness YC sat to the left of Witness YB she saw men entering the
carriage carrying different types of firearms and heard someone shout
get out. A shot was fired and she saw a man opposite her in the seat
with a wound behind his left ear. She believes six or seven shots were
fired.
13.22 Witness YD was a passenger on the train when it arrived at
STOCKWELL. Her attention was first drawn to a man with a rucksack
and she became concerned regarding his actions. This person would
appear to be ’Ivor’. Suddenly she became aware of a lot of shouting
coming from a group of men at the door to the carriage. She heard
either ‘this is it’ or’ there he is’. She then recalls a seeing a man sitting
two seats away with a gun to his neck, the gun was pointed directly into
the joint between the man’s neck and head. The man holding the gun
was standing over the other man holding the gun at arms length. She
then saw flashes and heard a quiet popping noise. She was not able to
identify any of the men as police officers neither did she hear the word
‘police’ shouted
13.23 Witness YE was a passenger on the train when it reached
STOCKWELL. He became aware of people running towards the train
and heard someone who he assumed was a police officer say
something like ‘that’s the man, that’s the one’. He was pointing at man
wearing a blue denim jacket, black T-shirt and jeans. He states this man
was carrying a small rucksack that he described in some detail. Two
other police officers entered the carriage and held the man down. The
officers were wearing hats with the word ‘Police’ on them. The man
was held down by the two officers and he saw one of them with a
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handgun shoot the man four or five times.
13.24 Witness YF was a passenger on the train when it reached
STOCKWELL. He was sitting with his back to the platform. He heard a
noise and saw about four men who he assumed from the caps they
were wearing were armed police officers. Immediately he was aware of
something happening inside the carriage to his right. Four or five
officers appeared to be pinning someone to the floor. He particularly
noticed one officer ‘knelt down in a prone position’ and another pointing
a machine gun at someone on the floor poised ready to fire. He heard
some shots and assumed the officer with the machine gun must have
fired them...
My comment is that this bunch of incompetent cretins would make the Keystone Cops look good.