Body-mind
Quickie from wiki: “A symbol is something such as an object, picture, written word, sound, or particular mark that represents something else by association, resemblance, or convention. For example, a red octagon may stand for "STOP". On maps, crossed sabers may indicate a battlefield. Numerals are symbols for numbers.
All language consists of symbols. The word "cat" is not a cat, but represents the idea of a cat.
Psychology has found that people, and even animals, can respond to symbols as if they were the objects they represent. Pavlov's dogs salivated when they heard a sound which they associated with food, even if there was no food.â€
Nixon said “I am not a crookâ€, immediately everyone thought of Nixon as a crook.
“I am pro-life†and everyone thinks of me as a person who has great respect for life.
“I am pro-choice†and everyone thinks of me as a person who has great regard for freedom of choice.
“Don’t think of an elephant†and everyone starts thinking about an elephant.
When I speak of mind almost everyone thinks of a stand alone entity functioning in a logical manner in which the body is merely a house for its place of habitation until death, at which time it, sometimes called the soul, floats away to a spiritual kingdom.
I have coined the word body-mind, which I first discovered by reading Mark Johnson’s book The Meaning of the Body, because I wish the reader to think not of the mind as a separate entity residing in the body but because I want the reader to think of a body-mind gestalt. That is to say that the mind is an embodied mind, which cannot stand alone just as the heart cannot stand alone with the body bracketed.
Quickie from Wiki: “The psychologist, Carl Jung, who studied archetypes, proposed an alternative definition of symbol, distinguishing it from the term "sign". In Jung's view, a sign stands for something known, as a word stands for its referent. He contrasted this with symbol, which he used to stand for something that is unknown and that cannot be made clear or precise.â€
Body-mind
Body-mind
This is why we should not put labels on people, especially children.
"Out, damned spot! out, I say!"
- William Shakespeare, Macbeth, 5.1
Body-mind
Well you didn't really coin it...and the issue of whether the mind exists distinct from the body or not has been around for many more years than even your august presence.
That said, the issue with a non-dualistic approach is the general inability to point to an actual connection, or even interconnection between the mind and body.
We're capable of keeping a body alive with no mind via technology, and while I'm not sure it's ever been attempted, I don't especially see why the application of technology couldn't keep at least a -brain- alive without a body, though that brings in the next big question of dualism/monism.
If the mind is something other than sequences of neurons firing (I could say philosophically, "if we have free will") then the mind must be somehow distinct from the brain, because we can view the functioning of the brain and the sequences of action and reaction that seem to be the only things occuring.
But if that -is- all that is going on, then the China Brain problem would appear to be causing an inaccurate result, because it appears that something more than pure mechanics is going on to create a "mind" as we understand the term.
So I guess what it comes down to is just an incomplete expression of your stance then, because I don't actually see what you're trying to suggest.
You say that you want us to view the mind and body as interconnected, but don't actually elucidate your thougts on just what the mind even IS. Is it purely biological and biochemical? Nothing but neuron logic-gates firing in sequence? If so, it seems like you're saying less that mind and body go together, and more than mind IS body.
If the mind isn't purely biological and biochemical...what is it then? What is the extra bit and how does that extra bit actually connect to the body at all?
Closing with that Jung quote sounds like you're trying to say "Mind is a symbol, and look, I'm pointing out a different definition of symbol which means 'we don't understand it'" Well if we don't understand it, how can you possibly be trying to draw such a strong conclusion about how it functions?
That said, the issue with a non-dualistic approach is the general inability to point to an actual connection, or even interconnection between the mind and body.
We're capable of keeping a body alive with no mind via technology, and while I'm not sure it's ever been attempted, I don't especially see why the application of technology couldn't keep at least a -brain- alive without a body, though that brings in the next big question of dualism/monism.
If the mind is something other than sequences of neurons firing (I could say philosophically, "if we have free will") then the mind must be somehow distinct from the brain, because we can view the functioning of the brain and the sequences of action and reaction that seem to be the only things occuring.
But if that -is- all that is going on, then the China Brain problem would appear to be causing an inaccurate result, because it appears that something more than pure mechanics is going on to create a "mind" as we understand the term.
So I guess what it comes down to is just an incomplete expression of your stance then, because I don't actually see what you're trying to suggest.
You say that you want us to view the mind and body as interconnected, but don't actually elucidate your thougts on just what the mind even IS. Is it purely biological and biochemical? Nothing but neuron logic-gates firing in sequence? If so, it seems like you're saying less that mind and body go together, and more than mind IS body.
If the mind isn't purely biological and biochemical...what is it then? What is the extra bit and how does that extra bit actually connect to the body at all?
Closing with that Jung quote sounds like you're trying to say "Mind is a symbol, and look, I'm pointing out a different definition of symbol which means 'we don't understand it'" Well if we don't understand it, how can you possibly be trying to draw such a strong conclusion about how it functions?
Body-mind
It appears to me that CS (Cognitive Scence) has two paradigms, symbol manipulation (AI), and conceptual metaphor. When I speak of CS here I am speaking of the conceptual metaphor paradigm.
Cognitive science has radically attacked the traditional Western philosophical position that there is a dichotomy between perception and conception. This traditional view that perception is strictly a faculty of body and conception (the formation and use of concepts) is purely mental and wholly separate from and independent of our ability to perceive and move.
Cognitive science has introduced revolutionary theories that, if true, will change dramatically the views of Western philosophy. Advocates of the traditional view will, of course, “say that conceptual structure must have a neural realization in the brain, which just happens to reside in a body. But they deny that anything about the body is essential for characterizing what concepts are.”
The cognitive science claim is that ”the very properties of concepts are created as a result of the way the brain and body are structured and the way they function in interpersonal relations and in the physical world.”
The embodied-mind hypothesis therefore radically undercuts the perception/conception distinction. In an embodied mind, it is conceivable that the same neural system engaged in perception (or in bodily movements) plays a central role in conception. Indeed, in recent neural modeling research, models of perceptual mechanisms and motor schemas can actually do conception work in language learning and in reasoning.
A standard technique for checking out new ideas is to create computer models of the idea and subject that model to simulated conditions to determine if the model behaves as does the reality. Such modeling techniques are used constantly in projecting behavior of meteorological parameters.
Neural computer models have shown that the types of operations required to perceive and move in space require the very same type of capability associated with reasoning. That is, neural models capable of doing all of the things that a body must be able to do when perceiving and moving can also perform the same kinds of actions associated with reasoning, i.e. inferring, categorizing, and conceiving.
Our understanding of biology indicates that the body has a marvelous ability to do as any handyman does, i.e. make do with what is at hand. The body would, it seems logical to assume, take these abilities that exist in all creatures that move and survive in space and with such fundamental capabilities reshape it through evolution to become what we now know as our ability to reason. The first budding of the reasoning ability exists in all creatures that function as perceiving, moving, surviving, creatures.
Cognitive science has, it seems to me, connected our ability to reason with our bodies in such away as to make sense out of connecting reason with our biological evolution in ways that Western philosophy has not done, as far as I know.
It seems to me that Western philosophical tradition as always tried to separate mind from body and in so doing has never been able to show how mind, as was conceived by this tradition, could be part of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Cognitive science now provides us with a comprehensible model for grounding all that we are both bodily and mentally into a unified whole that makes sense without all of the attempts to make mind as some kind of transcendent, mystical, reality unassociated with biology.
Quotes from “Philosophy in the Flesh”
Cognitive science has radically attacked the traditional Western philosophical position that there is a dichotomy between perception and conception. This traditional view that perception is strictly a faculty of body and conception (the formation and use of concepts) is purely mental and wholly separate from and independent of our ability to perceive and move.
Cognitive science has introduced revolutionary theories that, if true, will change dramatically the views of Western philosophy. Advocates of the traditional view will, of course, “say that conceptual structure must have a neural realization in the brain, which just happens to reside in a body. But they deny that anything about the body is essential for characterizing what concepts are.”
The cognitive science claim is that ”the very properties of concepts are created as a result of the way the brain and body are structured and the way they function in interpersonal relations and in the physical world.”
The embodied-mind hypothesis therefore radically undercuts the perception/conception distinction. In an embodied mind, it is conceivable that the same neural system engaged in perception (or in bodily movements) plays a central role in conception. Indeed, in recent neural modeling research, models of perceptual mechanisms and motor schemas can actually do conception work in language learning and in reasoning.
A standard technique for checking out new ideas is to create computer models of the idea and subject that model to simulated conditions to determine if the model behaves as does the reality. Such modeling techniques are used constantly in projecting behavior of meteorological parameters.
Neural computer models have shown that the types of operations required to perceive and move in space require the very same type of capability associated with reasoning. That is, neural models capable of doing all of the things that a body must be able to do when perceiving and moving can also perform the same kinds of actions associated with reasoning, i.e. inferring, categorizing, and conceiving.
Our understanding of biology indicates that the body has a marvelous ability to do as any handyman does, i.e. make do with what is at hand. The body would, it seems logical to assume, take these abilities that exist in all creatures that move and survive in space and with such fundamental capabilities reshape it through evolution to become what we now know as our ability to reason. The first budding of the reasoning ability exists in all creatures that function as perceiving, moving, surviving, creatures.
Cognitive science has, it seems to me, connected our ability to reason with our bodies in such away as to make sense out of connecting reason with our biological evolution in ways that Western philosophy has not done, as far as I know.
It seems to me that Western philosophical tradition as always tried to separate mind from body and in so doing has never been able to show how mind, as was conceived by this tradition, could be part of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Cognitive science now provides us with a comprehensible model for grounding all that we are both bodily and mentally into a unified whole that makes sense without all of the attempts to make mind as some kind of transcendent, mystical, reality unassociated with biology.
Quotes from “Philosophy in the Flesh”
Body-mind
So I take that post to mean essentially "Yes I am claiming that the mind and body are not seperate and distinct" which I managed to puzzle out from your first post as well.
You still haven't answered my more fundamental questions however, namely:
Are the mind and body still distinct but not seperate (In the same way that shoelaces and shoes are distinct but not seperate, you could pull the laces out of the shoes and look at them on their own, but neither functions properly without the other)
Are the mind and body neither distinct nor seperate? (In the same way, I suppose, that a cake is made of flour, egg, etc etc, but you can't actually seperate any of the componants that make it up, because of the degree to which they are intermixed)
If it is case B, as it seems to be from what I can glean by inference from your statements, how do you explain the ability to have a functioning -mind- while the body no longer functions, or vice versa? Or do you suggest that in such cases, while the brain may be firing neurons, there is no actual functioning mind? And if yes to -that- if there are neurons firing and no functioning mind, by what mechanism does the mind function -other- than that?
And for reference, an objection to mind/body dualism is not an "attack on western philosophy" as you claim, since western philosophy has been addressing the problem itself for many years. Have a look at Otto Neurath or George Berkeley.
You still haven't answered my more fundamental questions however, namely:
Are the mind and body still distinct but not seperate (In the same way that shoelaces and shoes are distinct but not seperate, you could pull the laces out of the shoes and look at them on their own, but neither functions properly without the other)
Are the mind and body neither distinct nor seperate? (In the same way, I suppose, that a cake is made of flour, egg, etc etc, but you can't actually seperate any of the componants that make it up, because of the degree to which they are intermixed)
If it is case B, as it seems to be from what I can glean by inference from your statements, how do you explain the ability to have a functioning -mind- while the body no longer functions, or vice versa? Or do you suggest that in such cases, while the brain may be firing neurons, there is no actual functioning mind? And if yes to -that- if there are neurons firing and no functioning mind, by what mechanism does the mind function -other- than that?
And for reference, an objection to mind/body dualism is not an "attack on western philosophy" as you claim, since western philosophy has been addressing the problem itself for many years. Have a look at Otto Neurath or George Berkeley.
Body-mind
Devonin;1162005 wrote:
If it is case B, as it seems to be from what I can glean by inference from your statements, how do you explain the ability to have a functioning -mind- while the body no longer functions, or vice versa? Or do you suggest that in such cases, while the brain may be firing neurons, there is no actual functioning mind? And if yes to -that- if there are neurons firing and no functioning mind, by what mechanism does the mind function -other- than that?
What I am trying to say in my post is that SGCS (Seond Generation Cognitive Science) has given us a revolutionary new theory that challenges the essential Western traditional mode of understanding related to how human cognition functions.
If it is case B, as it seems to be from what I can glean by inference from your statements, how do you explain the ability to have a functioning -mind- while the body no longer functions, or vice versa? Or do you suggest that in such cases, while the brain may be firing neurons, there is no actual functioning mind? And if yes to -that- if there are neurons firing and no functioning mind, by what mechanism does the mind function -other- than that?
What I am trying to say in my post is that SGCS (Seond Generation Cognitive Science) has given us a revolutionary new theory that challenges the essential Western traditional mode of understanding related to how human cognition functions.
Body-mind
So what you're saying is, when I ask you personally a question about something you posted, you can respond either with a pre-written text wall that is mostly on topic, or not at all?
I'm asking -you- to clarify what -you- are presenting as -your- belief on the subject.
Are the mind and body still distinct but not seperate (In the same way that shoelaces and shoes are distinct but not seperate, you could pull the laces out of the shoes and look at them on their own, but neither functions properly without the other)
Are the mind and body neither distinct nor seperate? (In the same way, I suppose, that a cake is made of flour, egg, etc etc, but you can't actually seperate any of the componants that make it up, because of the degree to which they are intermixed)
If it is case B, as it seems to be from what I can glean by inference from your statements, how do you explain the ability to have a functioning -mind- while the body no longer functions, or vice versa? Or do you suggest that in such cases, while the brain may be firing neurons, there is no actual functioning mind? And if yes to -that- if there are neurons firing and no functioning mind, by what mechanism does the mind function -other- than that?
Do you have any answers to these questions which are not found in something you've already written in years past?
I'm asking -you- to clarify what -you- are presenting as -your- belief on the subject.
Are the mind and body still distinct but not seperate (In the same way that shoelaces and shoes are distinct but not seperate, you could pull the laces out of the shoes and look at them on their own, but neither functions properly without the other)
Are the mind and body neither distinct nor seperate? (In the same way, I suppose, that a cake is made of flour, egg, etc etc, but you can't actually seperate any of the componants that make it up, because of the degree to which they are intermixed)
If it is case B, as it seems to be from what I can glean by inference from your statements, how do you explain the ability to have a functioning -mind- while the body no longer functions, or vice versa? Or do you suggest that in such cases, while the brain may be firing neurons, there is no actual functioning mind? And if yes to -that- if there are neurons firing and no functioning mind, by what mechanism does the mind function -other- than that?
Do you have any answers to these questions which are not found in something you've already written in years past?
Body-mind
The midnd body is a gestalt. I do not think that shoes and laces form a gestalt.
I have no answers for your questions.
I have no answers for your questions.
Body-mind
So when asked for clarification of something you're presenting as your idea, you have no answers for me. Good to know.
Body-mind
The mind is always looking for an excuse to avoid discipline. There is two sides of you. One hundred and eighty degrees of agreeable and one hundred and eighty degrees of disagreeable. One percent is all that is needed to shift your emotion. One hundred and eighty one to the left, start the path of disagreeable action, or very agreeable. You are in control. Listen to the voice of agreeable things. Rather than the complaints of the disagreeable mind.
Holy Tablets Chapter 11 Tablet 9 v 9-10 “But most of all; will, virtue, industry, and good works come into the world by the examples you place before the young. Better is it to hide and subdue your temper in the presence of the young, then to conquer a whole state by force.â€
Holy Tablets Chapter 11 Tablet 18 v 60 “You will earn the trust and respect of others if you work for good. If you work for evil you are making a mistake.â€
The Holy Tablets
By Rev . Dr Malachi Z . York
Nuwaubians
Holy Tablets Chapter 11 Tablet 9 v 9-10 “But most of all; will, virtue, industry, and good works come into the world by the examples you place before the young. Better is it to hide and subdue your temper in the presence of the young, then to conquer a whole state by force.â€
Holy Tablets Chapter 11 Tablet 18 v 60 “You will earn the trust and respect of others if you work for good. If you work for evil you are making a mistake.â€
The Holy Tablets
By Rev . Dr Malachi Z . York
Nuwaubians
Never Argue With An Idiot. They Drag You Down To Their Level Then Beat You With Experience.
When An Elder Passes On To Higher Life , Its Like One Of The Library Have Shut Down
To Desire Security Is A Sign Of Insecurity .
It's Not The Things One Knows That Get Him Or Her In Trouble , Its The Things One Knows That Just Isn't So That Get Them In Trouble
When you can control a man's thinking you don't have to worry about his action ...:driving:
When An Elder Passes On To Higher Life , Its Like One Of The Library Have Shut Down
To Desire Security Is A Sign Of Insecurity .
It's Not The Things One Knows That Get Him Or Her In Trouble , Its The Things One Knows That Just Isn't So That Get Them In Trouble
When you can control a man's thinking you don't have to worry about his action ...:driving: